Formal languages for policy have been developed for access control and conformance checking. In this paper, we describe a formalism that combines features that have been developed for each application. From access control, we adopt the use of a saying operator. From conformance checking, we adopt the use of operators for obligation and permission. The operators are combined using an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination yields benefits to both applications. For access control, we overcome the problematic interaction between hand-off and classical reasoning. For conformance, we obtain a characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission.
Introduction
Access control is an important problem in trust management systems. Informally, a trust management system involves a set of actors or principals, and a set of controlled or regulated actions, e.g., accessing medical information, or downloading a song. The goal of such a system is to administrate requests to perform actions. Trust management systems are commonly decomposed into two (interacting) components [1] : (a) authentication -determining the source of a request, and (b) access control -determining whether a request is permitted according to a policy. Abadi et al. [3] cast access control as a problem for logic. We assume as given an action (p), which is controlled by a principal (A), and a request to perform p from a principal (B). Access is granted if we can prove, using A's policy, that A says that B is permitted to perform p. In access control logics, such as [1-3, 16, 17] , says is treated as a (modal) operator. However, the use of an operator for permission has not been explored.
The concept of representation is prevalent in access control policies, and it forms the central focus of this work. Representation arises in situations where a principal is held to declarations made on her behalf (cf. [18] ). For example, consider a scenario where a software company authorizes project managers to permit their team members to access the production server. If a project manager says that a team member is permitted to access the server (on behalf of the company), we conclude that the company says that the team member is permitted to access the server. In such a scenario, project managers represent the company on permitting access to the server. All access control logics provide principals with the capability to let other principals represent them on statements. In the example above, the company would say, in its policy, that "Project managers represent the company on permitting team members to access the production server". The manner in which such a policy is formally expressed depends on the logic, and we will discuss a few choices in later sections.
In this paper, we argue for an explicit account of permission in a logic for access control. We motivate and develop a logic that combines saying and permission, using an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination leads us to a novel account of representation. In the logics of saying, where there is no notion of permission, representation is accommodated using variants of the hand-off axiom [1] . Abadi [1] pointed out some problematic interactions between the hand-off axiom and classical reasoning, which we will discuss in detail in Section 2.1. The use of permission provides a way to avoid these problems. An explicit account of permission leads naturally to an explicit account of obligation, which in turn leads us to examine legal powers and conformance checking. We now introduce these topics. Legal Power: Representation is a special case of the broader concept of legal power. Hohfeld, in his seminal work, defined the concept of power as follows [ 
31, Page 44]:
A person (or persons) may be said to have the power to effect a change in legal relations, if the change in legal relations results from some superadded facts that are under his volitional control.
We decompose this definition into three components, to give the main intuitions for our approach:
1. The description of power -A principal (A) grants the power of representation to another principal (B) on certain statements, if A says that B is permitted to issue those statements (on her behalf). 2. The "superadded facts" by which a power is exercised -B exercises the power of representation by issuing statements on behalf of A.
3. The change in legal relations -If A grants the power of representation to B, and B exercises this power, then we will infer that the statement issued by B is issued by A as well.
The logical analysis of power has been of interest for several years [18, [34] [35] [36] 40] . Our approach is related to two lines of research. With regard to the description of power (Item 1 above), Lindahl [40, Part II] (see also [34] ) suggested that various notions of power can be distinguished by nesting obligations and permissions with an action modality. Saying is our analog of the action modality. With regard to the change in legal relations (Item 3 above), Jones and Sergot [35] and Gelati et al. [18] describe general frameworks to reason about situations where an act by a principal counts as a means to create a state of affairs within an institution. We consider a restricted scenario where a statement by one principal counts as an identical statement made by another principal. However, in [18, 35] , the concept of counts as is taken to be the description of power itself, and it does not arise via saying. The dependence of power on saying, in our approach, leads us to a novel analysis of recursive notions of power, e.g., "empowerment to empower". We discuss the differences in Section 2.2.
Conformance Checking: The problems of access control, representation, and power arose for us while extending our prior work [14] on conformance checking to privacy regulation. We introduce the problem of conformance here, and discuss how the ideas in [14] relate to this work in Section 2.3. In conformance, one is interested in checking whether the operations of organizations obey a policy. We are given a policy and a description of an organization's operations (as a state or trace). An organization (A) conforms to the policy if we can prove that for all p, if the policy says that A is required or obligated to do p, then A does p. The design of logics for conformance, notably deontic logic, has been of interest for several years, and we refer the reader to [33, 45] for a broad perspective. In recent years, the focus has been more on tailoring logics for the regulations at hand, and examples include business contracts [4, 19-21, 27, 38] and health-care regulations [10, 14] . Our focus in this work is on how power interacts with the question of conformance. Contributions and Outline: In this paper, we motivate and design a formalism that combines saying and permission, with applications to access control and conformance. The combination yields benefits to both applications:
1. For access control, we propose a new decidable axiomatization which accommodates delegation [3, 39] and "speaking for" [2, 3, 16] . Our approach overcomes the problematic interactions with classical reasoning, pointed out by Abadi [1] . "Speaking for" and delegation are obtained as consequences of an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. 2. For conformance, the proposed axiomatization is used to reason about declarative powers [18] , by nesting saying with obligation and permission.
We obtain a novel analysis of recursive notions of power, e.g., "empowerment to empower". Conformance, as the satisfaction of obligations, is shown to be decidable.
In Section 2, we give a detailed motivation and background for our approach in three parts. First, we consider representation in access control, under which we include delegation [3, 39] and "speaking for" [1, 3, 16] . Second, we discuss examples of powers, and compare our approach to the counts as frameworks for power [18, 35] . And, finally, we discuss how we integrate the work here with our prior work [14] .
Section 3 develops a logic in the form of two interacting components. The inference component determines what has been said, and involves the choice of appropriate axioms [1, 3, 17] . We introduce two axioms to characterize the interaction between saying and permission. The decidability of the resulting logic is established. The saying component is used to create new utterances. For this component, we extend the formalism in [14] , which is a generalized form of logic programming. The modularization allows us to use restricted forms of quantification while preserving decidability of access control and conformance. We also prove a non-interference property which is crucial for the distributed policies that arise in access control.
In Section 4, we discuss our formalism in the context of related work. We consider access control examples, and conformance in the presence of powers. We also identify some interesting lines for further research. Section 5 concludes.
Permission to Speak
In this section, we motivate the explicit use of saying and permission in a formal language for policy. Section 2.1 considers the problem of representation in access control, under which we include delegation [3, 39] and "speaking for" [1, 3, 16] . In Section 2.2, we discuss examples of powers conveyed by nested permissions. We compare and contrast our approach with the counts as approaches to power. Finally, we discuss how we integrate the work here with our prior work [14] , to clarify some methodological decisions (Section 2.3).
Representation in Access Control
While there are a wide variety of access control logics, one commonality that stands out is a notion of saying [1] . We can express the fact that a principal makes a statement. We use says l(A) ϕ to denote that principal A says ϕ in the set of laws l(A). Informally, a law is understood as a single statement in the policy of a principal, e.g., a hospital says "Alice is permitted to access her health information", in its policy. And, the interpretation of a set of laws is the conjunction of the individual laws. These intuitions are formalized in Section 3. Our approach differs from others in that we associate statements to a principal via a set of laws (says l(A) ϕ) rather than directly with the principal (says A ϕ). This indirection lets us use saying to reason about exceptions to laws, as in [14] , and we will discuss an example in Section 3.3.
All access control logics give a principal the ability to let another principal make statements on her behalf. As an example (based on [16] ), consider a file access scenario, where an administrator (A) has control the operation of deleting files shared by groups of principals. When there are many shared files in the system, A cannot personally handle all requests. Suppose that the administrator authorizes the leader of a group (B) to decide when a particular file is to be deleted (del). In this scenario, we say that B represents A on del, and we wish to conclude that if says l(B) (del), then says l(A) (del).
How do we accommodate this inference? A naive approach is to introduce "says l(B) (del) ⇒ says l(A) (del)" into A's policy (where ⇒ is the implication connective of the underlying logic). However, such statements create an access control risk, because "says l(B) (del) ⇒ says l(A) (del)" could be introduced by B, thereby giving B the ability to decide whether any file is to be deleted.
To address this security risk, a principal A is only allowed to introduce statements of the form says l(A) ψ. Additional machinery (usually an axiom) is needed to accommodate representation. Abadi [1] discusses several alternatives, involving variants of the hand-off axiom:
B represents A on del is expressed as:
The hand-off axiom lets us conclude that says l(B) (del) ⇒ says l(A) (del). However, the hand-off axiom has displeasing consequences in classical logics. For example, says l(B) ϕ ⇒ (¬ϕ ⇒ says l(B) ψ) (for all ψ) is provable [1] , i.e., if a statement by B fails, then B gives access to all the actions that she controls. The solution to this problem has been to move to an intuitionistic setting, as in [2, 16, 17] .
We suggest that the problem is not with classical reasoning, but with the hand-off axiom. The key idea is to reformulate the axiom using the interaction between saying and permission. We now introduce the reformulated version of the axiom, followed by a discussion of its benefits.
We say that B represents A on del, if A says that B is permitted to say del. More formally, the statement says l(A) (P B (says l(B) del)) is added to A's policy, where P B (says l(B) del) is read as "B is permitted to say del". The following are equivalent versions of the axiom of representation:
• If A says that B is permitted to say ϕ, then if B says ϕ, A says ϕ
The axiom of representation is intended for a particular sense of speaking/saying, i.e., speaking on someone's behalf. This sense of saying is the usual one in access control. To simplify matters, we do not explicitly represent the principal on behalf of whom a statement is being made.
"Speaking for" [2, 3, 16 ] is a case of representation when one principal represents another on all statements. If B speaks for A, we wish to conclude says l(B) ϕ ⇒ says l(A) ϕ for all ϕ. "Speaking for" has a compelling definition in our approach. We say that B speaks for A if A permits B to say anything (⊥) on her behalf, i.e., says l(A) P B (says l(B) ⊥).
A novelty in our approach is that "speaking for" and hand-off are both obtained as a consequence of the axiom of representation. In [2, 3, 16] , "speaking for" and hand-off are not related, i.e., the former involves an algebra over principals or second-order quantification, and the latter is obtained using an axiom (which implies hand-off). This suggests that the representation axiom is quite different from the hand-off axiom. It is tempting to relate the representation axiom to a restricted version of hand-off:
However, even for this restricted case, we do not know of a complete semantics for hand-off, which makes it difficult to show that a statement is not provable (Abadi et al. [3] observe similar difficulties). We believe that the representation axiom is a persuasive alternative to hand-off, because it yields a decidable logic with a complete semantics, and more importantly, it has an intuitive interpretation.
A restricted version of the axiom of representation has been proposed by Becker et al. [7] , in the context of the authorization language SECPal. In SECPal, representation is restricted to atomic predicates, and hence, "speaking for" cannot be accommodated. Moreover, the relationship between permission and obligation is not explored. Our formalism generalizes SECPal, to accommodate both "speaking for" and obligation. We now discuss further motivation for our approach.
Powers and Nested Constructions
In this section, we consider examples of powers that arise via nested obligations and permissions. We compare and contrast our approach to the counts as approaches to power [18, 35] . The comparison is intended to illustrate the interplay between power and saying. We then discuss an example where our approach offers only a limited analysis.
We begin by discussing our approach to nested permissions. Consider the following statement: "A hospital (H) permits a patient (A) to permit her mother (B) to access her information". We will rephrase the permission as follows: H says that A is permitted to say that B is permitted to access her information. Formally, this is expressed as: says l(H) (P A (says l(A) (P B access))). If A does indeed permit access to her mother (says l(A) (P B access)), we will conclude says l(H) (P B access) using the axiom of representation, i.e., H permits access to B. As a result, nested permissions are related to representation, i.e., "H permits A to permit B to do ϕ" iff "A represents H in permitting B to do ϕ".
We now turn to the analysis by Gelati et al. [18] . To simplify presentation, we describe their approach using the notation that we have already introduced. In [18] , declarative power, which includes representation, is defined formally in terms of a counts as operator/connective:
A (ϕ) is read as "H grants A the power to declare ϕ on its behalf". And, CountsAs(says l(A) ϕ, says l(H) ϕ) is read as "A saying ϕ counts as B saying ϕ". The logic of counts as [18, 35] has broad applicability, and a detailed exposition is well beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, it suffices to note that a version of the following is provable:
⊢ φ is read as "φ is provable", i.e., φ is a theorem of the language. The key observation here is that power (conveyed by counts as) can result in the creation of statements, using (P2). However, the converse is not true. Let us return to the example of nested permissions see why this is important. Using (P1) and (P2), we can show that:
And, (P3) plays the role of the representation axiom. As a result, our approach is quite similar to that of Gelati et al. [18] , when there is one level of nesting. However, differences arise when we consider one more level of nesting.
Suppose H says that A is empowered to empower B to permit C to access her information. Note that empowerment can be paraphrased as permission to say in our approach, and the analysis would proceed analogously to the previous case. Gelati et al. [18] express this empowerment to empower as: DP H A (DP H B (P C access)). Let ϕ = P C access. Using (P1) and (P2), we obtain:
Given DP H A (DP H B (ϕ)), if A exercises this power by empowering B to declare ϕ, we will conclude, using (P3), that says l(H) (DP H B (ϕ)), i.e., H says that B is empowered to declare ϕ. However, the following is not provable:
Thus, B cannot exercise the power in the same way as A, due to the difference between (P3) and (P5). This assymetry, between primary and recursive powers, arises because the counts as operator is taken to be the description of power itself, and it does not arise via saying (or some other action). 1 The dependence of power on saying, in our approach, leads to an analogous treatment of primary and recursive powers.
Finally, we consider an example of nested obligations to illustrate a scenario where our approach gives only a limited analysis. We adopt the definition of obligation as the dual of permission, i.e., P A ϕ = ¬O A ¬ϕ (O A ϕ is read as ϕ is obligatory for A). Consider the following statement: "A says that B is required to forbid her child (C) from playing near the road (play)". As we did with the nested permissions, we paraphrase it as "A says that B should say that C is forbidden from playing near the road". Formally, this is expressed as: says l(A) O B says l(B) O C ¬play. If B imposes this requirement by saying so (says l(B) O C ¬play), we will conclude that B has fulfilled her obligation toward A, i.e., B conforms w.r.t. A. Does this capture the intent of the statement? Consider an alternate paraphrase of the statement: "A says that B is required to see to it that C does not play". And, it may require a stronger action of B, e.g., physically preventing C from playing near the road. The analysis of such requirements is beyond the scope of this work. The action modalities in the logics of power [18, 34, 35, 40] offer a good solution.
Exceptions and Doesn't Say
The problem of exceptions to laws has been studied extensively for several years [5, 44, 51] , and is related to the broader area of non-monotonic reasoning [41, 46, 47, 49] . In [14] , building on Reiter's Default Logic [49] and Kripke's theory of truth [37] , we expressed laws using labeled conditional statements of the form:
Our informal interpretation of such statements was "If ϕ is true, then the regulator says ψ via the law labeled (id)", where "id" is an identifier for the law. This interpretation of rules has the flavor of the counts as connective [18, 35] , i.e., ϕ counts as a statement of ψ from the regulator. Now, we can consider statements of the form:
(id1) The regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id) → ψ
′
In other words, "If the regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id), then the regulator says ψ ′ via the law labeled (id1)". Does not say is useful in expressing exceptions to laws, and the law labeled (id) would serve as an exception to the law labeled (id1). We discuss examples in Section 3.3.
Exceptions make regulations non-monotonic, in the sense that adding a new exception would prevent certain conclusions that were drawn before. There are also well-established reinterpretations of non-monotonic logics as modal logics, and here, we refer the reader to some classic works on autoepistemic logic [28, 46] . Given these connections, an important question that arises is whether the underlying logic for saying should be non-monotonic. The approach we take in this work is to start with a monotonic logic with saying, obligation, and permission (Section 3.2), and then integrate it into a non-monotonic framework (Section 3.3). The idea is that the non-monotonic component resolves exceptions, giving us a consistent set of statements on which to base access control and conformance decisions. This aspect of our approach was motivated purely by methodological convenience, and sufficed for the regulations at hand. A proper non-monotonic treatment of nested modalities is a challenging problem (see [28] ), and we leave an investigation to future work. 
A Logic for Access Control and Conformance
In this section, we develop a logic in the form of two interacting components -(a) the inference component, which involves the choice of appropriate axioms, and (b) the saying component, which is used to represent policies. Figure 1 shows the interaction between the components of the access control system. There are two kinds of actions of interest -(1) operational acts, e.g., downloading a song, and (2) speech acts. The operational acts are described using a state, which contains the interpretation of predicates, and the speech acts are described using laws.
A principal speaks by introducing laws. In Figure 1 , the principals A and B introduce the laws 1 and 2 respectively. The laws are evaluated using the axioms to produce a set of utterances, i.e., what the principals say via their laws. A set of laws can be thought of as a logic program, and utterances as the extensions that result from the program (via a fixed point computation). Once we have the utterances, there are several decision problems of interest. The access control problem is to decide whether a request is permitted by the set of utterances. The conformance problem is to decide whether operational and speech acts satisfy the obligations imposed by the utterances, and if they do not, violations are reported.
In Section 3.1, we introduce an example from privacy regulation, which we will use to illustrate the various definitions. Section 3.2 is an overview of the inference component. We describe (axiomatically) a logic with two modalities -saying and obligation. In Section 3.3, we adapt the formalism in [14] for the saying component. We extend [14] in two ways. First, we prove a noninterference property which is crucial for the distributed policies that arise in access control (Section 3.4). Second, we show that conformance, in the presence of nested obligations and permissions, is decidable (Section 3.5).
Example
We will use an example from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (cf. [10] ), to illustrate the various definitions. HIPAA regulates the uses and disclosures of patient health information, and provides a natural test bed for investigating both access control and conformance. The following example is intended to illustrate several subtleties involved in reasoning about rights:
(1) A patient has the right to view his records that are maintained in a designated record set, except for: a. Psychotherapy notes. b. Records compiled for a legal proceeding. c. ...
There are three (types of) principals associated with this right:
• The regulatory authority behind HIPAA, which enforces the right.
• Patients, who can exercise the right, and
• Principals who maintain records of the patient, and have to conform to the right. Section 3.2 is concerned with how to formally express the phrase "has the right". In Section 3.3, we deal with the exceptions. Sections 3.4 and Section 3.5 consider the access control and conformance aspects.
The Inference Component -Axioms
In this section, we develop a predicate logic with two modalities saying and obligation. We allow formulas with free variables, but no quantifier over objects. The quantification over objects is carried out in the process of saying (Section 3.3), which uses provability in the propositional subset of the language defined here. We begin by defining the syntax: Definition 1 (Syntax). Given sets Φ 1 , ..., Φ n (of predicate names), countable sets of object names O, principal names O P ⊆ O, variables X, variables for principals X P ⊆ X, identifiers ID, and a function l : O P → 2 ID , the language L(Φ 1 , ..., Φ n , O, O P , X, X P , l, ID), abbreviated as L, is defined as follows:
where, y ∈ X P ∪ O P , and α generates atomic predicates of the form p(z 1 , ..., z j ) with p ∈ Φ j and (z 1 , ..., z j ) ∈ (X ∪ O)
j . In addition, ∅ ⊂ Id y ⊆ l(y) if y ∈ O P and Id y = l(y) otherwise (y ∈ X P ). We assume that for all distinct A, B ∈ O P , l(A) ∩ l(B) = ∅ and l(A) = ∅, i.e., the assigned identifiers are disjoint, and non-empty.
The set of formulas generated by each BNF rule are referred to as
There is a set of object names O with a distinguished set O P ⊆ O called principals. Principals include individual persons, such as patients and doctors, and institutions, such as hospitals and regulatory authorities. We use upper case letters for principals, e.g., A, B. Other named objects (O − O P ) include entities with no associated notion of agency, e.g., medical records and songs. We use lower case letters for these objects, except for the letters {x, y, z} which are reserved for variables. It is useful to divide the objects in O − O P further into sorts, but we avoid it to simplify notation. Variables are divided into two sorts as well, i.e., all variables X, and variables for principals X P . In a slight abuse of notation, we will use the symbols for variables, i.e., x, y and z, to stand for a generic element in
O y ϕ is read as "ϕ is obligatory for the principal y". Permission is defined as the dual of obligation, i.e., P y ϕ = ¬O y ¬ϕ.
The saying operator is understood as follows. Principals speak by introducing identified laws, as shown in Figure 1 . The function l assigns non-empty and disjoint sets of identifiers to each principal, and for example, l(A) denotes the set of identifiers for laws introduced by the principal A ∈ O P . says Idy ϕ is read as "y says ψ via the laws Id y ". In the case where Id y = l(y), says l(y) ψ is read as "y says ψ via her laws", or briefly "y says ψ".
We give some examples to clarify the notation for identifiers. Given A ∈ O P , let l(A) = {1, 2}. The formulas says l(A) ϕ and says {1,2} ϕ are identical. In many examples, we will have need only for the notation says l(A) ϕ.
2 Specific identifiers (e.g., says {1} ϕ) will be used to accommodate exceptions to laws (Section 3.3). Exceptions are often conveyed by phrases such as "except as specified in Section 120 of HIPAA" [10, 14] , and a subset of identifers would correspond to the laws in "Section 120 of HIPAA". Given a variable over principals x ∈ X P , we will only use the notation says l(x) ϕ. This is useful, for example, to grant powers to a class of principals, e.g., patients of a hospital.
We now mention a peculiarity of Definition 1. The BNF rules ensure the alternation of obligation and saying modalities, e.g.,
Following von Wright [53] , we understand obligations as applying to actions and their consequences. The language L ϕy (obtained from the first BNF rule) is used to describe actions of a principal y -(a) atomic actions, (b) combinations of actions (using connectives), or (c) saying, which is (a consequence of) a speech act. An obligation is an opinion, which is created via a speech act, but is not an act by itself. These restrictions are similar in spirit to the logics of power [18, 34, 35, 40] .
The statements in L will be used in the inference component of access control, i.e., to determine what has been said. In other words, we will be given a set of utterances U and a question ψ, and we need to determine whether ψ is provable from U . We focus on provability for the propositional subset of L, i.e., without variables. The propositional subset of L has the modalities says IdA ϕ and O A (ϕ) (for all A ∈ O and Id A ⊆ l(A)).
A1 All substitution instances of propositional tautologies. We adopt the axiomatization in Figure 2 . A1 and R1 give us propositional reasoning. A2 and R2 are common to both saying and obligation. A3 and A4 are specific to saying and obligation respectively. Finally, A5 and A6 describe the interaction between the two modalities.
The notion of provability is of crucial interest. We say that ϕ is provable (denoted ⊢ ϕ), if ϕ is an instance of the axioms A1-A6 or follows from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2. Given a finite set of formulas ∆, we say that ϕ is provable from ∆, denoted ∆ ⊢ ϕ, if ⊢ ( ∆) ⇒ ϕ.
We mention some provable statements that we will use in the example from HIPAA (Section 3.2.2): Proposition 1. The following are provable:
The proofs are easy and we leave the details to the reader. Items 1 and 2 show that versions of axioms A5 and A6 hold for obligation. Item 3 gives us speaking for, i.e., B speaks for A, as we discussed in Section 2.1.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. We begin in Section 3.2.1 by discussing the various axioms in the context of related work. Section 3.2.2 considers the example from HIPAA, and the various subtleties involved in reasoning about rights. We then present a complete Kripke semantics for the axioms (Section 3.2.3), and use it to show that provability is decidable (Section 3.2.4).
Discussion of Axioms
We now discuss the axioms. The axioms A1 and A2, together with the rules R1 and R2, gives us the modal logic K. The K axiomatization was used by Abadi et al. [3] as a basis for all (classical) access control logics. From A3, it follows that if A says ϕ via the laws (Id A ), then ϕ also holds w.r.t. a larger set of laws issued by A (Id ′ A ). In Section 3.3, when evaluating regulations, we will obtain a statement of the form says {idA} ϕ from each law of A. And, A3 can be informally understood as a monotonicity condition, i.e., if ϕ is a consequence of what is said via an individual law, then ϕ is said via all sets of laws that include it. At a first glance, A3 is at odds with the fact that regulations are nonmonotonic. However, as shown in Figure 1 , we are interested in reasoning about utterances, which are obtained from the laws after all exceptions have been resolved. If the law changes, then the utterances will have to be recomputed.
The K axiomatization, together with A4, gives us the the modal logic KD. This axiomatization is common to many systems, giving it the name Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) (c.f. [33] ). We note that SDL is a very simplistic system of obligation, and several objections can be raised. The most serious objection is that SDL does not cope with contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations (see, e.g., [22, 42, 48] ). A CTD obligation is one that arises when another has been violated. This is useful, for example, in business contracts to describe mitigating actions [20, 21, 27, 38] , e.g., "paying a fine", upon failure to deliver goods. We do not address CTD structures in this work, as they are not as prevalent in privacy regulation as they are in contracts. Governatori and Rotolo [22] propose that CTDs are not a problem with obligations per se, but can be understood as a special kind of exception. We agree entirely with their perspective. However, accommodating these kinds of exceptions involves the introduction of a preference operator, and we leave this to future work.
As we discussed in Section 2.1, A5 is needed to accommodate notions of representation in access control. The self-respecting axiom, A6, is read as "If A permits herself to say ϕ, then A says ϕ". We discuss the use of A6 in the example from HIPAA.
Example
We consider the example from HIPAA, introduced in Section 3.1. In this section, our focus is on the utterances obtained from the laws of the various principals.
Let H stand for (the regulator who wrote) HIPAA. And, let Alice (A) be a patient whose records (r) are maintained by an insurance company run by Bob (B). Let us assume further that A has the right to access her records. The utterance obtained from H's laws would be:
The direct reading of (u1) in English is unwieldy, i.e., we get "H says that A is permitted to say that B is required to say that A is permitted to access her records". A better reading is obtained by eliding all occurrences of says that appear immediately above an obligation or permission, except for the outermost one. Applying this ellipsis to (u1), we get: says l(H) P A ...O B ...P A access(A, r), which is read as: "HIPAA says that Alice is permitted to require Bob to permit her to access her records". We will use such readings henceforth.
The word right does not have a unique translation into logic. Hohfeld [31] pointed out that the word right is used in different senses, and depending on the context, it can entail a permission, claim, or power. 3 The formulation in (u1) corresponds to the power interpretation. As we mentioned in Section 1, our descriptions of powers follows the suggestion of Lindahl [40, Part II] (see also [34] ), in terms of nesting obligations and permissions with an action modality.
How does Alice exercise this right?
In our approach, rights are exercised by the introduction of a law. The specific mechanism for introducing such laws is application dependent. For example, if Alice sends an email to Bob requiring him to grant her access, then this may count as Alice exercising her right (see [18, 35] ). Alice's attempt to exercise her right would result in the following utterance:
In other words, Alice says that Bob is required to permit her to access her records.
How does Bob comply with this right?
In our approach, this happens via Bob's access control policy. Suppose Bob wants to permit a patient to access their records only if HIPAA requires it. Bob's policy is represented as follows:
In other words, Bob permits HIPAA to require him to permit Alice to view her records. Note that Bob has no regard for Alice's requirement to see her records, but only what HIPAA says.
Let ∆ consist of the utterances (u1), (u2), and (u3) above. Since Alice is attempting to view her records, the access control system tries to prove that says l(B) P A access(A, r) from ∆. The derivation proceeds as follows: (d1) ∆ ⊢ says l(H) O B says l(B) P A access(A, r) (from (u1) and (u2) using A5).
(d2) ∆ ⊢ says l(B) O B says l(B) P A access(A, r) (from (u3) and (d1) using Proposition 1 item 1)
Step (d1) is understood as HIPAA enforcing Alice's right, i.e., HIPAA requires Bob to permit Alice to view her records. In step (d2), Bob acknowledges HIPAA's authority by requiring himself to permit Alice to view her records.
Step (d3) shows the utility of A6, i.e., by forcing Bob to say what he requires himself to say. Due to (d3), Alice is indeed permitted to view her records! In Section 3.5, we will show how blame can be assigned to Bob if he fails to introduce (d3) or something that implies it. In summary, to reason about a right, we had to use utterances from the enforcer (HIPAA), the person exercising the right (Alice), and the person complying with it (Bob). The precise manner in which Alice's utterance is obtained is left unspecified. In assessing violations of rights, the issue in question is often whether the right was exercised. For example, Bob may claim that Alice did not request to see her records. We do not believe that this is a problem for logic, but it is a problem in implementing a system that allows principals to exercise their rights. However, we do believe that the logic provides a good intuition for the inferences involved, given the appropriate utterances.
The reasoning involved in this example is outside the scope of prior access control logics [1-3, 11, 16, 17, 39] , because obligation is not accommodated. We believe that the reasoning can be accommodated by the counts as frameworks for power [18, 35] , but as discussed in Section 2.2, some reformulation is needed.
Semantics, Soundness, and Completeness
In this section, we provide a Kripke semantics for which the axiomatization is sound and complete. Semantic completeness is used mainly as a tool, for example, to show that a statement is not provable. Identifying a compelling semantics for says is an important open problem in access control logics (see [1] ), and we do not address it in this work. 4 We begin by defining models (Kripke structures):
Definition 2 (Models). Given countable sets of object names O, principal names O P ⊆ O, Φ 1 , ..., Φ n (where Φ j is a set of predicate names of arity j), identifiers for rules ID, and l :
• S is a set of states
corresponds to a description of s according to the laws labeled with identifiers in Id (taken conjunctively).
corresponds to an idealization of s, for which the principal A is held responsible.
For the axioms A3-A6 we need the following constraints C3-C6 (resply). For all s ∈ S:
There exists
C5 and C6 can be understood in the context of soundness (Lemma 1). Given the object names O, O P ⊆ O, predicate names (Φ 1 , ..., Φ n ), identifiers ID, and the function l, the space of models is denoted by M(O, O P Φ 1 , ..., Φ n , ID, l), abbreviated as M. We can now define satisfaction and validity, and we restrict attention to the propositional fragment of L:
and a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the relation (M, s) |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• The semantics of conjunction and negation is defined in the usual way.
•
We can now define validity:
Proof. We need to show that the axioms are valid, and that the rules preserve validity. It is well-known that the axioms A1 and A2 are valid, and that R1 and R2 preserve validity in all Kripke structures. The validity of A3 and A4 can easily be shown using C3 and C4. We discuss the case for A5. Suppose A5 is not valid. There exists M , s, ϕ, A, B, Id A and Id B such that:
• (M, s) |= says IdA (P B says IdB ϕ)
• (M, s) |= says IdB ϕ, and
Since C5 holds, there are two cases to consider:
, then:
Hence, A5 is valid. The proof for A6 is similar.
The rest of this section gives the proof. We will use a canonical model argument (c.f. [29] ). We show the contrapositive, i.e., if ⊢ ϕ, then |= ϕ. In other words, if ⊢ ϕ then there exist M and s such that (M, s) |= ¬ϕ. We begin with some terminology.
We say that ϕ is consistent if ¬ϕ is not provable ( ⊢ ¬ϕ). A finite set of formulas {ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n } is consistent if ϕ 1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕ n is consistent. An infinite set of formulas is consistent if every finite subset is consistent. A set of formulas ∆ is maximal consistent if for all ϕ ∈ L − ∆, ∆ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent. The following are properties of maximal consistent sets: Proposition 2. Given a maximal consistent set ∆:
The proof is straightforward. We now define the canonical model, in which every consistent formula is true at some state:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets
We now show that the canonical model satisfies the frame constraints:
Proposition 3. The canonical model satisfies the frame constraints C3-C6
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case for C5. Given the canonical model M = (S, I Φ1 , ..., I Φn , δ L , δ O ), ∆ ∈ S, and suppose for the purpose of contradiction that there exists ∆ ′ ∈ δ L (∆, Id A ) such that:
. By construction, there exists says IdB ψ ∈ ∆ such that ¬ψ ∈ ∆ ′ .
. By Proposition 4 (below), there exists says IdA P B says IdB ϕ ∈ ∆ such that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ .
Using Proposition 2, says IdB (ϕ∨ψ) ∈ ∆ and says IdA P B says IdB (ϕ∨ψ) ∈ ∆. So, says IdA (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ ∆, and hence ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ ∆ ′ . That is ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ or ψ ∈ ∆ ′ , which contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆ ′ . The proof of C6 is similar.
Proposition 4. Given the canonical model
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for all ϕ ∈ L, if says IdA P B says IdB ϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ . Let F be the smallest set such that:
• If says IdA ϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ F , and
We claim that F is consistent. 5 Suppose not:
(4) By construction, says IdA ϕ i ∈ ∆ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So, using A2 and (3), we can derive that says IdA P B says IdB (ψ 1 ∨ ... ∨ ψ m ) ∈ ∆. As a result, ψ 1 ∨ ... ∨ ψ m ∈ ∆ ′ , and there exists ψ i ∈ ∆ ′ where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
(5) By construction, ¬ψ i ∈ ∆ ′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which together with (4) contradicts the consistency of ∆ ′ .
We can extend F into a maximal consistent set
The completeness proof is now finished in the usual way (see, for example, [29] ). Given the canonical model M and a state ∆, it is easy to show that for all ϕ ∈ L, (M, ∆) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ∆. Furthermore, given a consistent ϕ, we can construct a maximal consistent set ∆ such that ϕ ∈ ∆. As a result, for every consistent ϕ, there exists a state ∆ in the canonical model such that (M, ∆) |= ϕ. Hence, if ⊢ ϕ, then |= ϕ. We observe that compactness follows as a corollary of the existence of the canonical model:
Corollary 1 (Compactness). An infinite set of formulas is satisfiable iff every finite subset is satisfiable.
Given an infinite set of formulas ∆, if every finite subset is satisfiable, then by soundness, every finite subset of ∆ is consistent. And, by definition, ∆ is consistent. We can extend ∆ into a maximal consistent set, corresponding to a state in the canonical model.
Decidability
In this section, we adapt the completeness proof to show the bounded-model property, i.e., if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a model of bounded size (exponential in the size of φ). We begin by defining the set of subformulas:
Definition 5 (Subformulas). Given a propositional φ ∈ L, the set of subformulas sub(φ) is the smallest set such that:
The last three clauses in Definition 5 are used to ensure that C5 and C6 hold. Note that in Clause 5, we consider disjunction over sets of formulas ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 . Formulas which are not disjunctions are understood as disjunctions over singleton sets, e.g., ϕ ∧ ψ = {ϕ ∧ ψ}. To obtain the analog of Proposition 3, we need to ensure that formulas appearing within the scope of says are closed under disjunction. We use sets of formulas to ensure that only finitely many disjunctions are introduced, i.e., a disjunct need not be repeated. Due to Clauses 5 and 6, the number of subformulas is exponential in the size of φ. It is possible to eliminate both these clauses, by filtering the model that we construct here. But, this further filtration is not needed for the results proved in this work. Clause 7 is key to obtaining the analog of Proposition 4.
Given φ ∈ L, we will consider maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ). A set ∆ ⊆ sub(φ) is said to be maximal consistent iff ∆ is consistent and for all ψ ∈ sub(φ) − ∆, ∆ ∪ {ψ} is inconsistent. We write ∆ ⊢ ϕ to denote ⊢ ∆ ⇒ ϕ. The definition of the canonical model needs a few changes:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ)
We will show that the canonical model of φ satisfies the frame constraints. We adapt Propositions 3 and 4 to obtain Propositions 5 and 6 resply.
Proposition 5. The canonical model of φ satisfies the frame constraints C3-C6
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case for C5.
. There are two cases to consider.
First, we have the boundary case, where there is no subformula says (∆ 1 , B) , 
We proceed by contradiction analogous to the completeness proof:
. By construction, there exists ψ ∈ sub(φ) such that says Id ′ B ψ ∈ ∆ for some Id •
. By Proposition 6 (below), there exists ϕ ∈ sub(φ) such that says Id * Since ⊢ ϕ 1 ⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ), we have ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ or ψ ∈ ∆ ′ , which contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆ ′ . The proof of C6 is similar. 
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for all ϕ ∈ sub(φ) with says Id * B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), if ∆ ⊢ says IdA P B says IdB ϕ, then ¬ϕ ∈ ∆ ′ . Let F be the smallest set such that:
We claim that F is consistent (see Footnote 5). Suppose not:
(1) There exists {ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n , 
(5) By construction, ¬ψ i ∈ ∆ ′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which together with (4) gives us a contradiction.
Using Clauses 5 and 6 in Definition 5, it follows that says Id * B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), and using A3, says A standard argument (see, for example, [29] ) can be used to show that for all ϕ ∈ sub(φ), (M φ , ∆) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ∆. We can now establish decidability:
Proof. Decidability is established via the bounded model property:
φ is satisfiable in M φ iff φ is satisfiable One direction is trivial, i.e., if φ is satisfiable in M φ , then φ is satisfiable (by definition). For the other direction, we can use a standard filtration argument, to show that M φ can be obtained from the canonical model (Definition 4).
We set aside the issue of complexity, and more importantly, the identification of tractable fragments to future work. The techniques discussed here would be most relevant to such an investigation. In the following section, we will use provability (and its negation) to describe the process of saying.
The Saying Component -Policies
In this section, we describe the representation and evaluation of policies or regulations. The result of evaluating regulation is a set of utterances, which forms the basis for access control and conformance. The formalism developed here is an extension of [14] , and is a generalized form of logic programming. Logic programs are popular in representing regulatory texts [23, 43, 52] , and access control policies [9, 12, 39] . We begin by defining the syntax of regulations:
Definition 7 (Syntax of Regulation). Given countable sets of identifiers ID, principal names O P , and a function
ID , a law is a statement of the form (id) ϕ → ψ, where ϕ ∈ L ϕ , ψ ∈ L ψ , and there exists A ∈ O P such that id ∈ l(A). The set of all possible laws is denoted by Laws(O P , l, L), abbreviated Laws.
A body of regulation Reg ⊆ Laws is a finite set such that for all id ∈ ID, there exists at most one pair
(id) ϕ → ψ is read as: "If ϕ is true, then A says ψ via the law (id)", where id ∈ l(A). To evaluate laws, we need a way to evaluate preconditions (ϕ ∈ L ϕ ). There are two kinds of atoms in L ϕ -predicates and formulas of the form says Idy ϕ. The predicates are evaluated against a state, and formulas of the form says Idy ϕ are evaluated provability (as defined in Section 3.2) from a set of utterances. We begin by defining states: Given a set of variables X, and principal variables X P , an assignment is a function v : X → O, such that for all x ∈ X P , we have v(x) ∈ O P . The set of all assignments is denoted by V (X, X P , O, O P ), abbreviated V .
Definition 8 (States and Assignments). Given countable sets O of object names, principal names
A state s ∈ S is a description of operations, and gives us information, for example, about the accesses to records that actually happened. The definition of utterances relies on propositionalizing formulas: Definition 9 (Propositionalization). Given φ ∈ L and an assignment v ∈ V , the propositionalization of ϕ w.r.t. v, denoted v(φ), is defined inductively as follows:
, where A = v(y) if y ∈ X P and A = y otherwise.
• v(says Idy ϕ) = says IdA (v(ϕ)), where Id A = l(v(y)) if y ∈ X P and Id A = Id y otherwise.
We can now define utterances:
Definition 10 (Utterances). Given a body of regulation Reg, and an assignment v ∈ V , an utterance is a statement v(says {id} ψ) such that id ∈ ID and (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg. The set of all utterances is denoted by U(Reg, V ).
To build intuition for the definitions, we first present a simplified version, which can accommodate some (but not all) kinds of regulations. We will then identify the difficult cases, and generalize the definition. Let us assume as given a state s, a body of regulation Reg and an assignment v ∈ V . We wish to determine whether the precondition of a law (ϕ ∈ L ϕ ) is "true" w.r.t. s, Reg and v. Consider the relation (s, Reg, v) |= 1 ϕ defined inductively as follows:
P2 Conjunction and negation are handled in the usual way P3 (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says Idy ψ ′ iff there exists a set U ⊆ U(Reg, V ) such that:
P3.1 For all φ ∈ U , there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ′ ∈ V such that (s, Reg, v ′ ) |= 1 ϕ and φ = v ′ (says {id} ψ), and
P3 is understood as follows. (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says Idy ψ ′ iff there is a set of utterances U such that all formulas in U come from laws with true preconditions (P3.1), and v(says Idy ψ ′ ) is provable from U (P3.2). We remind the reader that provability is defined in the propositional subset of the language L (Section 3.2). We now give an example to illustrate this definition: Proposition 7. Given a principal A ∈ O P with l(A) = {id1, id2}, and a body regulation Reg consisting of only the following statements:
Then for all s ∈ S and v ∈ V , we have:
Proof. The laws correspond to a standard pattern in default reasoning. The law (id1) is understood as an exception, and read as "If p(x) holds, then A says ¬q(x) via law (id1)". The law (id2) is the default, and read as "If A does not say ¬q(x) via law (id1), then A says q(x) via law (id2)".
The proofs of both items rely on a property of utterances that satisfy P3.1. Given a state s, let U s be the set of utterances such that for all v ∈ V :
It is easy to show that U 1 satisfies P3.1 iff U 1 ⊆ U s . Item 1: Suppose (s, Reg, v) |= 1 ¬p(x) for some v ∈ V . Then, v(says {id2} q(x)) ∈ U s . Hence, U s ⊢ v(says {id2} q(x)) (satisfying P3.2), and hence (s, Reg, v) |= 1 v(says {id2} q(x)). The converse is similarly verified. Item 2: Suppose (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says l(A) ⊥. It follows that there exists U 1 satisfying P3.1 such that U 1 ⊢ says l(A) ⊥. However, it is easily seen that U s ⊢ says l(A) ⊥, and since U 1 ⊆ U s , by propositional reasoning, U 1 ⊢ says l(A) ⊥, giving us a contradiction.
We note that there is nothing intrinsic about the formalism that prevents conflicts in a principal's laws. It is easy to construct a regulation Reg such that for all s ∈ S and v ∈ V , we have (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says l(A) ⊥. One has to explicitly prevent conflicts via the use of default rules, e.g., (id2) in the example above. It is also possible to modify P3 so that utterances with conflicts are not used, which would be in line with the approach of defeasible logic [20, 26, 47] . But, we do not explore this option in this work.
Next, we illustrate the sense in which regulations are non-monotonic:
There exist regulations Reg and Reg ′ such that Reg ⊂ Reg ′ , and a state s ∈ S, an assignment v ∈ V and a formula ϕ ∈ L ϕ such that:
Proof. We will give an example similar to the default rules discussed above. The key idea is to make use of a formula says l(A) ψ, where l(A) has some identifiers without corresponding laws in Reg. Let l(A) = {id1, id2, id3}, and Reg consists of only the following two laws:
We construct Reg ′ by adding a law, which conveys an exception, to Reg:
Given s ∈ S and v ∈ V such that (s, Reg, v) |= 1 r(x) ∧ ¬p(x) (the exception in (id3) applies, but the exception in (id2) does not), it follows that (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says l(A) q(x) and (s, Reg
As we mentioned, |= 1 is not well-defined for all kinds of regulations:
There is no relation |= 1 that satisfies the properties P1-P3
Proof. Given A ∈ O P and l(A) = {id}, consider a regulation Reg that consists of only the following statement:
In other words, "If A does not say p(x) via law (id), then A says p(x) via law (id)". The self-referential nature of this sentence, together with negation, is the source of the problem. We begin by observing that for all v ∈ V and U ⊆ U, U ⊢ v(says {id} p(x)) iff v(says {id} p(x)) ∈ U . Suppose (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says {id} p(x). By P3.2, there exists a set U such that U ⊢ v(says {id} p(x)), and so, v(says {id} p(x)) ∈ U . As a result, by P3.1, (s, Reg, v) |= 1 ¬ says {id} p(x), giving us a contradiction.
Suppose (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says {id} p(x). Then, (s, Reg, v) |= ¬ says {id} p(x). The set U = {v(says {id} p(x))} satisfies P3.1 and P3.2. So, (s, Reg, v) |= 1 says {id} p(x), giving us a contradiction.
To handle such circular statements, we use a technique from Kripke's theory of truth [37] , which also forms the basis for the Kripke-Kleene-Fitting semantics of logic programs [15] . There are two pieces of machinery needed. First, we move to a three-valued logic, where the third (middle) value stands for ungrounded. The values are denoted by B 3 = {⊤, ?, ⊥}. Second, we modify P3 to use a pair of sets of utterances (U, U ′ ) such that U ⊆ U ′ . Informally, U will be the set of utterances obtained from laws with true preconditions, while U ′ will be set of utterances from laws with true or ungrounded preconditions (by modifying P3.1). The truth of says Idy ϕ will determined using U , and falsity is determined using U ′ (by modifying P3.2). We note that it is not possible to define the threevalued interpretation in a manner isomorphic to P1-P3. This is because P3 implicitly assumes the existence of a unique fixed point, and this assumption no longer holds in the three-valued setting. We move the choice of (U, U ′ ) and P3.1 to a separate definition (Definition 12), and consider P1, P2, and a modified version of P3.2 together for a fixed (U, U ′ ) (Definition 11). We begin by defining a function tv which assigns truth values to preconditions:
Definition 11 (Evaluating Preconditions). Given a body of regulation Reg and a pair utterance sets
3 is defined as follows: Predicates are evaluated to true or false. Conjunction and negation are handled using the Kleene semantics.
Note that if U = U ′ , then tv (U,U ′ ) (says Idy ψ, s, v) ∈ {⊤, ⊥}, and is identical to P3.2. The third value arises only if U U ′ . We now define consistency for the pair of utterances (U, U ′ ), used in Definition 11. We need to ensure that U (resply. U ′ ) corresponds to laws with true (resply. true or ungrounded) preconditions:
Definition 12 (Consistent Utterances). Given a regulation Reg and a state s ∈ S, the utterance pair (U, U ′ ) is consistent iff for all φ ∈ U(Reg, V ) :
• If φ ∈ U , then there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ and tv (U,U ′ ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊤.
• If φ ∈ U ′ , then for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ, we have tv (U,U ′ ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
is consistent} is the set of all consistent utterance pairs w.r.t. Reg, V and s.
It is immediate from the definition that for all (U, U
Consider the self-referential example (from Proposition 9) -(id) ¬ says {id} p(x) → p(x). For this example, any pair (U, U ′ ) such that v(says {id} p(x)) ∈ U or v(says {id} p(x)) ∈ U ′ is not consistent, as that would mean assigning a value from {⊤, ⊥} to the says {id} p(x). Consistency ensures that tv (U,U ′ ) (says {id} p(x), s, v) = ? for all s ∈ S, v ∈ V and consistent pairs (U, U ′ ). A partial order is defined over the space of consistent utterance pairs:
) is a partially ordered set (poset).
We are now ready to define the function whose fixed points we will be interested in.
Definition 14 (Inflationary function). Given a poset (C
• φ ∈ U 2 iff there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ and
The existence of fixed points relies on some properties of I S U (Reg,V ) , i.e., being inflationary and monotonic:
. We are given that (U 1 , U ′ 1 ) is consistent. Hence, for all φ ∈ U:
• If φ ∈ U 1 , then by Definition 12, there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ and tv (U,U ′ ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊤. Therefore, by Definition 14, φ ∈ U 2 . We can conclude that U 1 ⊆ U 2 .
• If φ ∈ U 2 , then by Definition 12, for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ, we have tv (U,U ′ ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊥. Therefore, by Definition 14, φ ∈ U 2 . We can conclude that U 1 ⊇ U 2 .
Hence, by Definition 13, (
For the second and third items, we need the following observations. Given
= ⊥ These are established easily by induction over the structure of ϕ. Note that the claims are for all pairs of utterances, and not just the consistent ones.
is not consistent. Then, by Definition 12, there exists φ ∈ U such that:
• φ ∈ U 2 and for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says {id} ψ) = φ, we have tv (U2,U ′ 2 ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊤, and by (D1), tv (U1,U ′ 1 ) (ϕ, s, v) = ⊤. Therefore, by Definition 14, φ ∈ U 2 , giving us a contradiction.
• The second case (where φ ∈ U ′ 2 ) is contradicted similarly using (D2).
The proof of Item 3 is along similar lines.
The existence of fixed points is established using Zorn's lemma (cf. [50] ), which applies to chain-complete posets. Given a poset (C
. A poset is chain-complete if every chain has a supremum. We now show that (C s U (Reg,V ) , ≤) is a chaincomplete poset:
. It is also easy to see that if (U s , U ′ s ) is consistent, then it is the supremum of C ′ . Thus, it suffices to show that (U s , U ′ s ) is consistent, and this can be established by an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 10. The proof is obtained as a corollary to Zorn's Lemma (cf. [50] ), and we refer the reader to [14] for the argument.
6 To obtain the least fixed point, we consider the pair (U 0 , U
It is easy to see that if |U(Reg, V )| is finite (i.e., the number of objects O is finite), then there exists n ∈ N such that (U n , U ′ n ) is the least fixed point, i.e., (U n , U
We also note that in the case of finite domains, |C s U (Reg,V ) | is finite, and so, the maximal fixed points can be enumerated (in theory). To make the approach practical, restrictions are needed. In [13] , we explored an assumption that lets us compile out occurrences of says in the preconditions of laws, leading to efficient checking for states with a large number of objects. These methods need to be extended to accommodate reasoning that arises via representation (axioms A5 and A6), and we leave an investigation to future work.
A state s together with a consistent utterance pair forms the basis for all decision problems. We define a notion of validity at a state, which we will use to formalize access control and conformance decisions (in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 resply.):
Definition 15 (Validity at a State). Given a state s, a body of regulation
The choice of which utterance pair to use depends on the application. If there is a unique (least) fixed point, then it is the appropriate choice. However, matters are not so clear when there are multiple fixed points. We conclude this section with a discussion of examples to build intuition about the definitions of access control and conformance.
Examples
We discuss two examples. First, we consider the statements from HIPAA (presented in Section 3.1 and also discussed Section 3.2.2). A unique fixed point will be obtained for these statements. Second, we consider an example involving multiple fixed points. Example 1: Consider the statements from HIPPA in Section 3.1. Let H ∈ O P stand for the regulatory authority behind HIPPA, and l(H) = {1, 1a, 1b}. As we discussed in Section 3.2.2, the phrase has the right is analysed as a power. We use the following abbreviation:
The HIPAA rule is formalized as follows:
(1) pat(x) ∧ rec(y, x, z) ∧ ¬ says {1a,1b} e(y) → hasRight(x, z, access(x, y)) (1a) psyNotes(y 1 ) → e(y 1 ) (1b) compForLegal(y 2 ) → e(y 2 )
The law (1) is read as follows: "If x is a patient (pat(x)), and y is a record of x maintained by z (rec(y, x, z) ), and HIPPA does not say that there is an exception applying to y (¬ says {1a,1b} e(y)), then HIPAA says that x has the right to access her records via the law (1)".
The law (1a) is read as follows: "If y 1 is a record of psychotherapy notes (psyNotes(y 1 )), then HIPAA says that an exception applies to y 1 via the law (1a)". And, the law (1b) is read as follows: "If y 2 is a record compiled for legal proceedings (compForLegal(y 2 )), then HIPAA says that an exception applies to y 2 via the law (1b)".
We set aside the important problem of defining these predicates further, i.e., the definitional aspects of the law [33] . For example, HIPPA provides rules describing who counts as a patient, and the interpretation of pat(x) is dependent on these rules. In addition, the predicate e(y) could be interpreted as a permission to the maintainer of y not to grant access.
7 Such extensions are easily accommodated.
Suppose Alice (A) wants to view her records (r) which are maintained by Bob (B). Alice introduces the following rule:
(2) Bob must show me my records.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the manner in which this rule arises is left unspecified. For example, Alice may send an e-mail to Bob, requiring to see her records. Alice's law is formalized as follows. Let A ∈ O P stand for Alice, and B ∈ O P stand for Bob. In addition, l(A) = {2}. Law (2) is formally expressed as:
Bob complies with this request via his access control policy. Suppose Bob's policy consists of the following rule: (3) HIPAA is permitted to require me to permit a patient to access her records.
Let l(B) = {3}. Law (3) is formally expressed as: Table 1 shows a state together with the fixed point utterances obtained from l(H), l(A), and l(B). Here, r is a record about Alice maintained by Bob (rec(r, A, B) ), which has been compiled for legal proceedings (compForLegal(r)). The precondition of HIPAA's law (1b) is true, and we obtain the utterance says {1b} e(r). As a result, the precondition of (1) is false, and no right is granted to Alice. The preconditions of Alice's and Bob's laws ( (2) and (3) resply.) are true, and the corresponding utterances are obtained.
Objs Predicates
Fixed Point Utterances H pat(A), rec(r, A, B) says {1b} e(r) A, r ¬psyNotes(r) Let us consider the questions of access control and conformance informally, given the state and fixed point in Table 1 . Is Alice permitted to access her record? No, because HIPAA does not require Bob to permit her to access it. Is Bob conformant? On one hand, HIPAA doesn't require anything of Bob, so yes. On the other hand, Alice says that Bob is required to permit her to access her records, and he does not comply with this request. Thus, conformance is better seen as a relation between two principals w.r.t. a set of laws. In Section 3.5, we will say that B conforms to A w.r.t. the laws l(A) iff B satisfies the obligations imposed by those laws. Example 2: We now discuss an example involving multiple fixed points, based on the well-known Nixon-diamond problem in Default Logic [49] . Consider the following laws: (4) Except as otherwise specified, quakers must be pacifists.
(5) Except as otherwise specified, republicans must not be pacifists.
The laws are formally expressed as:
Law (4) is read as "If x is a quaker (q(x)), and the regulator does not say that x is not required to be a pacifist (p(x)) via law (5), then the regulator says that x must be a pacifist via law (4)". Law (5) is read similarly, and r(x) is read as: "x is a republican". Table 2 gives an example of a state, where a principal (N ) for Nixon is a quaker (q(N )), a republican (r(N )), but not a pacifist (¬p(N )). The least fixed point is given by (U, U ′ ), where U = ∅ and U ′ consists of all utterances. The preconditions of both laws are ungrounded. This corresponds to skeptical reasoning in non-monotonic logic.
Two maximal fixed points are obtained. In the first fixed point in Table 2 ,
The precondition of law (4) (resply., law (5)) is true (resply., false). In the second fixed point in Table 2 
The precondition of law (5) (resply., law (4)) is true (resply., false). The maximal fixed points correspond to credulous reasoning in non-monotonic logic.
Fixed Let us consider the question of conformance informally. Given the state in Table 2 , does the principal N conform to the regulation? The answer depends on which fixed point we consider. If we consider the first fixed point, then the answer is no, because N is not a pacifist. If we consider the second fixed point, then the answer is yes, for the same reason. We note that if N wasn't both a quaker and a republican, a unique fixed point is obtained.
While the Nixon-diamond construction arises in the area of knowledge representation, the question of interest is whether there are regulations where multiple fixed points are needed. We have not encountered such examples. 
Non-interference in Access Control
An access control decision is made when a principal A requests the performance of action p which is controlled by B. Given a state s, regulation Reg and fixed point (U, U ′ ) resulting from the evaluation of policy, the decision problem is whether (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) says l(B) P A (p), i.e., does B say that A is permitted to perform p.
A problem with this definition is that the policies in access control are usually distributed. It is unreasonable to expect (U, U ′ ) to reside on a single system. Given that we wish to evaluate says l(B) P A (p), the question is whether a smaller set of utterances suffice to answer this question. In other words, the evaluation should be carried out locally by B or a designated evaluator for B, as in [6] .
Non-interference properties are used to obtain such results, and to demonstrate that the logic protects the rights of each principal [2, 17] . In our case, the access control decision is of the form (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) says IdB ψ, and this holds iff U ⊢ says IdB ψ. The goal is to identify a subset of utterances (U * ⊆ U ), such that U ⊢ says IdB ψ iff U * ⊢ says IdB ψ. Let us consider an example to build some intuition. Suppose we have four principals A, B, C, and D, with l(A) = {id1}, l(B) = {id2}, l(C) = {id3}, and l(D) = {id4}. Suppose C is a patient, and A and B maintain records about C. A only permits C to access her records, while B permits C to permit her mother (D) to access her records. Let U consist of the following utterances:
Now, suppose D wants to access C's records that are maintained by A. It is easy to see that U ⊢ says l(A) P D access(D, r). But, do we need all of the utterances in U to make this determination? Intuitively, no, because the only utterance from A is (u1) and there is no representation conveyed via (u1). So, (u1) alone should suffice to make this determination. In this case, we say that (u2) and (u3) do not interfere with the access control decision.
Next, suppose D wants to access C's records that are maintained by B. It follows that U ⊢ says l(B) P D access(D, r 1 ), and so D is indeed granted access. Here, (u2) is certainly relevant, and since it gives the power of representation to C, (u3) is also relevant. However, no mention of A is made by (u2) or (u3), and so, (u1) does not interfere with the access control decision.
We begin by defining the subset of utterances that are relevant to an access control decision:
Definition 16 (Reachable Utterances). Given a set of utterances U and a formula says IdB ψ, U * IdB is the smallest set such that:
If we think of formulas says IdB ψ as pointing to utterances in U (labeled Id B ), then U * IdB is the set of utterances that are pointed to directly (the first clause), or pointed to by subformulas of utterances that are pointed to (the second clause). In these terms, the computation of the set U * IdB corresponds to a reachability computation on a graph, and hence, we call it the set of reachable utterances. We believe that it is reasonable to restrict to the reachable utterances, because given the question says l(B) ψ, U * l(B) is determined by B and the principals to whom she grants the power of representation. We can now show the following:
Theorem 4 (Non-interference). Given a set of utterances U , for all says IdB ψ ∈ L, we have U ⊢ says IdB ψ iff U * IdB ⊢ says IdB ψ Proof. One direction follows easily using propositional reasoning, i.e., if U * IdB ⊢ says IdB ψ, then U ⊢ says IdB ψ, since U * IdB ⊆ U . For the other direction, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose U ⊢ says IdB ψ, and U * , which is to be understood as a copy of s. We assume that c(s) ∈ S and c(s) = c(s ′ ) iff s = s ′ . Given S 1 ⊆ S, c(S 1 ) denotes the set of states such that c(s) ∈ c(S 1 ) iff s ∈ S 1 . In addition, we add two special states s * (at which the contradiction will be obtained) and s W (which provides witnesses as needed for C5 and C6). 
We now describe the construction for the other states, starting with some notation.
Given
, we have the following cases:
The first clause ensures that (M ′ , s * ) |= says {idA} ϕ for all says {idA} ϕ ∈ U − U * IdB , since {id A } * = ∅. The second clause adds both the states that are accessible from s φ and their copies. The accessibility relations associated with a copy (c(s ¬ψ )) will be modified in order to preserve C5. The copies -For all C ∈ O P , Id C ⊆ l(C), and c(s) ∈ c(S):
Note that the second clause does not affect the truth of any subformula in U * IdB , and it ensures that there are witnesses as needed for C5 for the cases where δ ′ L (c(s φ ), Id A ) = ∅. Frame Constraints: We need to verify that the frame constraints hold in M ′ . The only difficulty is in showing that C5 holds at the copies and s * . Fix A, C, Id A and Id C . Given c(s) ∈ c(S), there are two cases:
Next we consider the state s * for which there are three cases:
, thereby satisfying C5. 3. Id * A = Id A and Id * C = Id C . In this case, C5 is satisfied because C5 holds in M and the copies of states are isomorphic.
Establishing the contradiction:
The following are established easily by induction:
We can now reason as follows:
the following condition holds. Either
The last two items contradict the assumption that U ⊢ says IdB ψ.
We note that the distinction between the inference component and the saying component allows us to restrict attention to inferences of the form U ⊢ says IdB ϕ, where U only has formulas of the form says IdA ψ. If the set U could contain arbitrary formulas, non-interference would have a more complex characterization, as in [17] . For example, if we allowed formulas of the form ¬ says IdA ψ in U , then any principal can render U inconsistent.
Conformance
We now turn to the definition of conformance. While the definition of conformance has some variation between the various formalisms [4, 14, 19-21, 27, 38] , all of them require a principal to satisfy the obligations that are imposed on her. In the context of contracts, several works [20, 21, 27, 38] accommodate reasoning about mitigating actions such as "paying a fine" if an obligation is not satisfied. The analysis of such mitigating actions is left to future work.
We define conformance as a relation between a principal and another principal w.r.t. a set of laws: 
In other words, conformance is the satisfaction of all obligations. The syntactic restrictions in Definition 1 justify the restriction to ϕ ∈ L ϕA , as these are the only formulas that can appear within the scope of O A . The restriction to fixed points (U, U ′ ), where U = U ′ , ensures that all formulas are either true or false. Definition 17 is not appropriate when U = U ′ , since classically provable formulas, e.g. ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, may be ungrounded. In such cases, the principal would be found (trivially) non-conformant. One way to accomodate these cases is to modify Definition 17 so that if (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) says IdB O A ϕ, we require only that ϕ be true or ungrounded. With this modification, our proof of decidability carries over to the case where U = U ′ . Let us apply Definition 17 to our example from HIPAA in Table 1 (Section 3.3). As we discussed, we are interested in the conformance of Bob (B). Bob does not conform to Alice (A) w.r.t. the law l(A) = {2}, because (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) says l(A) O B says l(B) P A access(A, r) and (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) says l(B) P A access(A, r). However, it can be shown that Bob conforms to HIPAA (H), w.r.t. the laws {1, 1a, 1b} = l(H). We will discuss additional examples in Section 4.2.
We now discuss the proof of decidability of conformance. Given a state s and a fixed point (U, U ′ ), there are potentially infinitely many formulas ϕ ∈ L ϕA such that (s, Reg)
. We will prove that it suffices to restrict attention to a single formula, which may be understood as a prime implicant of all the obligations imposed on A via the laws Id B .
The proof relies on properties of the canonical model of a formula (Definition 6). We begin with some notation. Given φ ∈ L, let M φ = (S, I Φ1 , ..., I Φn , δ L , δ O ) be the canonical model of φ. Recall that each state ∆ ∈ S is a maximal consistent set of subformulas of φ, i.e., ∆ ⊆ sub(φ). Given ∆ ∈ S and Id B ⊆ l(B), ∆ IdB is the set such that ϕ ∈ ∆ IdB iff there exists Id ′ B ⊆ Id B such that says Id ′ B ϕ ∈ ∆. Similarly, given ∆ ∈ S and A ∈ O P , ∆ A is the set such that ϕ ∈ ∆ A iff O A ϕ ∈ ∆.
We now establish some properties of maximal consistent sets that are useful in the proof.
The following hold for all ϕ ∈ L ϕA , ψ ∈ L ψ and ∆ ∈ S:
Proof. For the first two items, we will need the following observation. Given Γ ⊆ sub(φ), let S Γ ⊆ S be the set such that ∆ ∈ S Γ iff Γ ⊆ ∆. Then, for all ϕ ∈ L:
This follows using propositional reasoning, since S is the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(ϕ), and S Γ is the set of all maximal consistent sets containing Γ.
The proof of item 2 is similar. Item 3: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists ϕ ∈ L ϕA and ∆ ∈ S such that ∆ ⊢ says IdB O A ϕ, and ∆
combining M φ and M ′ as follows:
• S ′′ = S ∪ S ′ . We assume that S and S ′ are disjoint.
• 
The satisfaction of the constraints C3-C6 is immediate from the construction, as the only modification is to δ ′′ O (∆ ′ , A). The following are established easily by induction:
We can now reason as follows: (3) and (6), by soundness) Item (7) contradicts the assumption that ∆ ⊢ says IdB O A ϕ.
We are now ready to show that conformance checking is decidable: Proof. First, we observe that for all ϕ ∈ L ϕA , (s, Reg)
The key idea is to show that there is a formula ϕ U ∈ L ϕA such that:
Assuming that such a ϕ U exists, we can show the following:
For the other direction, we need the observation that for all φ ∈ L ϕA , if ⊢ φ, then (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) φ. Note that this claim does not hold when U = U ′ . When U = U ′ , the claim is easily verified by showing that the axioms A1-A3, A5, and A6 are valid at s w.r.t. (U, U ′ ), and that the rules R1 and R2 preserved validity. Instances of axiom schema A4 are not in L ϕA . Now suppose that (s, Reg)
Since checking whether (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) ϕ U is decidable, conformance checking is decidable, provided that such a ϕ U exists.
We now turn to the construction of ϕ U . Let M U = (S, I Φ1 , ..., I Φn , δ L , δ O ) be the canonical model for U . Let S U = {∆ 1 |∆ 1 ∈ S and U ⊆ ∆ 1 }. We will now define a formula ϕ ∆ for each ∆ ∈ S U , and define ϕ U as their disjunction:
We claim the following for all ∆ ∈ S:
Our analysis differs in an important way from Garg and Abadi [16] . We do not conclude that file1 is actually deleted, i.e., U ⊢ delfile1. In fact, we can show that there is no policy (as defined in Section 3.3) that lets us make this conclusion. delfile1 is true at a state where F conforms to l(F ), as per Definition 17. In some cases, it may be warranted to assume/axiomatize self-conformance, i.e., (says l(F ) O F (ϕ)) ⇒ ϕ. However, conflicting self-imposed requirements would make U inconsistent. Example 2: The delegation operator of Li et al. [39] has a compelling definition in our framework. The syntax (in Li et al. [39] ) for delegation is "x delegates (ϕ) d to y", where d is the depth of delegation. We define the schema ps(ϕ, x, d), where x is used to generate variable names, and d ∈ N :
• ps(ϕ, x, 1) = P x1 says l(x1) ϕ
• ps(ϕ, x, d) = P x d says l(x d ) (ϕ ∧ ps(ϕ, x, d − 1)), for d > 1
The statement "A delegates (delfile1) 2 to B" is interpreted as follows: A says delfile1 if B says it or anyone that B trusts says it. Suppose, in addition, that B delegates (delfile1) 1 to C, and C says delfile1. We express this with the following rules:
• (1) (x 2 = B) → ps(delfile1, x, 2)
• (2) (y 1 = C) → ps(delfile1, y, 1)
We assume that 1 ∈ l(A), 2 ∈ l(B) and 3 ∈ l(C). At the fixed point, we will have U ⊢ says l(A) delfile1, i.e., A says delfile1. Further re-delegations by C (by modifying statement 3) will not be attributed to A.
In the logic of Li et al. [39] , a representation statement is used to grant permission to speak without consuming delegation depth. If C represents B on delfile1, then C should be permitted to at most one re-delegation. Statement 2 is modified as follows:
• (2) (y 2 = C) → ps(delfile1, y, 2)
With this modification, a delegation by C will be attributed to A. The reader may have noticed the similarity between statement 1 and the modified version of statement 2. In our approach, delegation is just a special kind of representation. A delegates (ϕ) d to B iff B represents A on "delegating (ϕ) d−1 to anyone". If C represents B on "delegating (ϕ) d−1 to anyone", then she represents A as well. As Li et al. [39] point out, in the presence of representation, delegation depth does not have much meaning. For example, A may not wish to trust C to the same extent as B. There are a few options to address this issue by modifying the representation axiom. One way is to keep track of the delegation depth in the axiom, as in the SECPal language [7] . Yet another way is to keep track of the principal on behalf of whom a statement in made. We avoid these modifications, to simplify presentation.
Nested Obligations and Permissions
We discuss two examples of conformance in the presence of nested obligations and permissions. The first example illustrates how several fine-grained notions of conformance can be captured, and is intended to supplement the example from HIPAA in Section 3. The second example points out an important practical difficulty. Example 1: Consider the following law:
(6) The owners of parking lots ought to forbid parking near the entrance.
What does it mean to conform to (6) ? We analyze this sentence as follows: "The owners of parking lots ought to (introduce laws that) forbid parking near the entrance.". In other words, (6) is an obligation to introduce a prohibition. If the owner introduces such a law, then the person parking is viewed as nonconformant, but it is the owner that needs to conform to (6) . We can represent (6) in logic as follows: (6) Here own(x) is true iff x is the owner of a parking lot, p(y) is true iff y is a person, and pk(y, x) is true iff y parks near the entrance of the lot owned by x. l(x) refers to the laws that are introduced by x.
Let us assume a state s = (I Φ1 , ..., I Φn ) in which A is the owner of a parking lot, and B parks near the entrances of A's lot. The true predications are: {own(A), p(B), pk(B, A)}. In addition, A is assigned the identifier 7, i.e., l(A) = {7}. We will now consider two scenarios -(a) A does not introduce any laws, and (b) A introduces a law forbidding parking near the entrance. We are interested in the conformance (Definition 17) of the owner A and the driver B. The fixed point utterance pair is: (using the representation axiom A5), but (s, Reg) |= (U,U ′ ) ¬pk(B, A). Hence, B does not conform to {6}. In other words, the statement (6) conveys an obligation to A and if A conforms, the embedded obligation is conveyed to B. As we noted in Section 2.1, we are formalizing the notion of speaking on someone's behalf, i.e., the obligation (7) issued by A is understood as being on behalf of the issuer of (6) . Some applications may need a distinction between the different senses of saying. Example 2: Consider the following example: (8) You are required to allow a patient to see his records.
By our analysis, (8) is an obligation on the hospital to provide a permission. Suppose that a hospital introduces such a permission in its policy. Has it conformed to (8)? The problem arises in distinguishing between claimed permission, and actual permission. A hospital claims that it permits a patient to see his records, by making an appropriate rule. On the other hand, a hospital actually permits a patient to see his records, by taking an action, e.g., sending the records via mail.
worst-case complexities. Even if we exclude disjunction syntactically, the representation axiom can lead to constraints involving disjunction, as we saw in Propositions 3 and 5. This leads to the following question: Is there a fragment of the logic that accommodates representation, and yields a polytime decision procedure?
Due to the problematic interactions between hand-off and classical logic (Section 2.1), intuitionistic approaches have been developed [2, 16, 17] . While we have focused on the classical setting here, the representation axiom can be adapted to the intuitionistic setting. However, as Garg and Pfenning [17] point out, a notion of constructivism is also desirable in an intuitionistic logic. Constructivism requires the meaning of an operator to be independent of others, and as a result, axioms which describe interaction between operators (such as the representation axiom) are excluded. While constructivism is important in programming languages (see [2, 17] ), interaction axioms have also proved useful. For example, Halpern et al. [30] Finally, notions of time have been used in conformance checking [13, 19, 38] . The policies are used to synthesize monitors that are used to detect violations at runtime [13, 38] . Since the saying component (Section 3.3) uses the formalism in [13, 14] , notions of linear time can be easily added here, and the monitor synthesis in [13] can be used directly. Once notions of time are available, we can place constraints on how a policy changes [24, 25] . This leads to our final question: Are there useful interactions between saying and time, to characterize how a policy is updated?
Conclusions
We have motivated and described a logic for access control and conformance. The focus was on the interaction between saying and permission, as needed for these applications. We proposed two axioms to characterize their interaction (Section 3.2), and showed how these axioms could be incorporated into a logic programming approach (Section 3.3) .
A combined analysis of saying and permission yielded benefits to both applications. For access control, we find a way to avoid the problematic interaction between hand-off and classical reasoning. Our axioms yield a decidable logic with a complete semantics (Section 3.2), and we hope that they have intuitive appeal to the reader. For conformance, we obtained a characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission. We showed, in Section 3.5, that conformance checking remains decidable.
We believe that the joint study of access control and conformance is a rich area for research. In Section 4.3, we identified avenues for further inquiry.
